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BUSINESS CYCLE ACCOUNTING
BY V. V. CHARI, PATRICK J. KEHOE, AND ELLEN R. MCGRATTAN1
We propose a simple method to help researchers develop quantitative models of
economic fluctuations. The method rests on the insight that many models are equiva-
lent to a prototype growth model with time-varying wedges that resemble productivity,
labor and investment taxes, and government consumption. Wedges that correspond to
these variables—efficiency, labor, investment, and government consumption wedges—are
measured and then fed back into the model so as to assess the fraction of various fluc-
tuations they account for. Applying this method to U.S. data for the Great Depression
and the 1982 recession reveals that the efficiency and labor wedges together account for
essentially all of the fluctuations; the investment wedge plays a decidedly tertiary role,
and the government consumption wedge plays none. Analyses of the entire postwar
period and alternative model specifications support these results. Models with frictions
manifested primarily as investment wedges are thus not promising for the study of U.S.
business cycles.
KEYWORDS: Great Depression, sticky wages, sticky prices, financial frictions, pro-
ductivity decline, capacity utilization, equivalence theorems.
IN BUILDING DETAILED, QUANTITATIVE MODELS of economic fluctuations, re-
searchers face hard choices about where to introduce frictions into their mod-
els to allow the models to generate business cycle fluctuations similar to those
in the data. Here we propose a simple method to guide these choices, and we
demonstrate how to use it.
Our method has two components: an equivalence result and an account-
ing procedure. The equivalence result is that a large class of models, including
models with various types of frictions, is equivalent to a prototype model with
various types of time-varying wedges that distort the equilibrium decisions of
agents operating in otherwise competitive markets. At face value, these wedges
look like time-varying productivity, labor income taxes, investment taxes, and
government consumption. We thus label the wedges efficiency wedges, labor
wedges, investment wedges, and government consumption wedges.
The accounting procedure also has two components. It begins by measuring
the wedges, using data together with the equilibrium conditions of a proto-
type model. The measured wedge values are then fed back into the prototype
model, one at a time and in combinations, so as to assess how much of the ob-
served movements of output, labor, and investment can be attributed to each
wedge, separately and in combinations. By construction, all four wedges ac-
count for all of these observed movements. This accounting procedure leads
us to label our method business cycle accounting.
1We thank the co-editor and three referees for useful comments. We also thank Kathy Rolfe
for excellent editorial assistance and the National Science Foundation for financial support. The
views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.
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To demonstrate how the accounting procedure works, we apply it to two ac-
tual U.S. business cycle episodes: the most extreme in U.S. history, the Great
Depression (1929–1939), and a downturn less severe and more like those seen
since World War II, the 1982 recession. For the Great Depression period, we
find that, in combination, the efficiency and labor wedges produce declines in
output, labor, and investment from 1929 to 1933 only slightly more severe than
in the data. These two wedges also account fairly well for the behavior of those
variables in the recovery. Over the entire Depression period, however, the in-
vestment wedge actually drives output the wrong way, leading to an increase
in output during much of the 1930s. Thus, the investment wedge cannot ac-
count for either the long, deep downturn or the subsequent slow recovery. Our
analysis of the more typical 1982 U.S. recession produces essentially the same
results for the efficiency and labor wedges in combination. Here the investment
wedge plays essentially no role. In both episodes, the government consumption
wedge plays virtually no role.
We extend our analysis to the entire postwar period by developing some sum-
mary statistics for 1959–2004. The statistics we focus on are the output fluctua-
tions induced by each wedge alone and the correlations between those fluctu-
ations and those actually in the data. Our findings from these statistics suggest
that over the entire postwar period, the investment wedge plays a somewhat
larger role in business cycle fluctuations than in the 1982 recession, but its role
is substantially smaller than that of either the labor or efficiency wedges.
We begin the demonstration of our proposed method by establishing equiv-
alence results that link the four wedges to detailed models. We start with de-
tailed model economies in which technologies and preferences are similar to
those in a benchmark prototype economy, and we show that frictions in the de-
tailed economies manifest themselves as wedges in the prototype economy. We
show that an economy in which the technology is constant but input-financing
frictions vary over time is equivalent to a growth model with efficiency wedges.
We show that an economy with sticky wages and monetary shocks, like that
of Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000), is equivalent to a growth model with labor
wedges. In the Appendix, we show that an economy with the type of credit mar-
ket frictions considered by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) is equiv-
alent to a growth model with investment wedges. Also in the Appendix, we
show that an open economy model with fluctuating borrowing and lending is
equivalent to a prototype (closed-economy) model with government consump-
tion wedges. In the working paper version of this paper (Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2004)), we also showed that an economy with the type of credit
market frictions considered by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) is equivalent to a
growth model with investment wedges, and that an economy with unions and
antitrust policy shocks, like that of Cole and Ohanian (2004), is equivalent to
a growth model with labor wedges.
Similar equivalence results can be established when technology and pref-
erences in detailed economies are very different from those in the prototype
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economy. In such situations, the prototype economy can have wedges even if
the detailed economies have no frictions. We show how wedges in the bench-
mark prototype economy can be decomposed into a part due to frictions and
a part due to differences in technology and preferences by constructing alter-
native prototype economies that have technologies and preferences similar to
those in the detailed economy.
Our quantitative findings suggest that financial frictions that manifest them-
selves primarily as investment wedges did not play a primary role in the Great
Depression or postwar recessions. Such financial frictions play a prominent
role in the models of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999). More promising, our findings suggest, are models in which the under-
lying frictions manifest themselves as efficiency and labor wedges. One such
model is the input-financing friction model described here in which financial
frictions manifest themselves primarily as efficiency wedges. This model is con-
sistent with the views of Bernanke (1983) on the importance of financial fric-
tions. Also promising are sticky-wage models with monetary shocks, such as
that of Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000), and models with monopoly power,
such as that of Cole and Ohanian (2004) in which the underlying frictions
manifest themselves primarily as labor wedges. In general, this application of
our method suggests that successful future work will likely include mechanisms
in which efficiency and labor wedges have a primary role and the investment
wedge has, at best, a tertiary role. We view this finding as our key substantive
contribution.
In our quantitative work, we also analyze some detailed economies with
quite different technology and preferences than those in our benchmark pro-
totype economy. These include variable instead of fixed capital utilization, dif-
ferent labor supply elasticities, and costs of adjusting investment. For these al-
ternative detailed economies, we decompose the benchmark prototype wedges
into their two sources—frictions and specification differences—by constructing
alternative prototype economies that are equivalent to the detailed economies
and so can measure the part of the wedges due to frictions. We find that with
regard to the investment wedge’s role in the business cycle, frictions driving
that wedge are unchanged by different labor supply elasticities and worsened
by variable capital utilization—with the latter specification, for example, the
investment wedge boosts output even more during the Great Depression than
it did in the benchmark economy. With investment adjustment costs, the fric-
tions driving investment wedges do at least depress output during the down-
turns, but only modestly. Altogether, these analyses reinforce our conclusion
that the investment wedge plays a decidedly tertiary role in business cycle fluc-
tuations.
Our business cycle accounting method is intended to shed light on promising
classes of mechanisms through which primitive shocks lead to economic fluc-
tuations. It is not intended to identify the primitive sources of shocks. Many
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economists think, for example, that monetary shocks drove the U.S. Great De-
pression, but these economists disagree about the details of the driving mech-
anism. Our analysis suggests that models in which financial frictions show up
primarily as investment wedges are not promising while models in which fi-
nancial frictions show up as efficiency or labor wedges may well be. Thus, we
conclude that researchers interested in developing models in which monetary
shocks lead to the Great Depression should focus on detailed models in which
financial frictions manifest themselves as efficiency and labor wedges.
Other economists, including Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2004) and Prescott
(1999), emphasize nonmonetary factors behind the Great Depression, down-
playing the importance of money and banking shocks. For such economists,
our analysis guides them to promising models, like that of Cole and Ohanian
(2004), in which fluctuations in the power of unions and cartels lead to labor
wedges, and other models in which poor government policies lead to efficiency
wedges.
In terms of method, the equivalence result provides the logical foundation
for the way our accounting procedure uses the measured wedges. At a mechan-
ical level, the wedges represent deviations in the prototype model’s first-order
conditions and in its relationship between inputs and outputs. One interpreta-
tion of these deviations, of course, is that they are simply errors, so that their
size indicates the goodness-of-fit of the model. Under that interpretation, how-
ever, feeding the measured wedges back into the model makes no sense. Our
equivalence result leads to a more economically useful interpretation of the
deviations by linking them directly to classes of models; that link provides the
rationale for feeding the measured wedges back into the model.
Also in terms of method, the accounting procedure goes beyond simply plot-
ting the wedges. Such plots, by themselves, are not useful in evaluating the
quantitative importance of competing mechanisms of business cycles because
they tell us little about the equilibrium responses to the wedges. Feeding the
measured wedges back into the prototype model and measuring the model’s
resulting equilibrium responses is what allows us to discriminate between com-
peting mechanisms.
Finally, in terms of method, our decomposition of business cycle fluctuations
is quite different from traditional decompositions. Those decompositions at-
tempt to isolate the effects of (so-called) primitive shocks on equilibrium out-
comes by making identifying assumptions, typically zero–one restrictions on
variables and shocks. The problem with the traditional approach is that finding
identifying assumptions that apply to a broad class of detailed models is hard.
Hence, this approach is not useful in pointing researchers toward classes of
promising models. Our approach, in contrast, can be applied to a broad class
of detailed models. Our equivalence results, which provide a mapping from
wedges to frictions in particular detailed models, play the role of the identify-
ing assumptions in the traditional approach. This mapping is detailed-model
specific and is the key to interpreting the properties of the wedges we docu-
ment. For any detailed model of interest, researchers can use the mapping that
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is relevant for their model to learn whether it is promising. In this sense, our ap-
proach, while being purposefully less ambitious than the traditional approach,
is much more flexible than that approach.
Our accounting procedure is intended to be a useful first step in guiding the
construction of detailed models with various frictions to help researchers de-
cide which frictions are quantitatively important to business cycle fluctuations.
The procedure is not a way to test particular detailed models. If a detailed
model is at hand, then it makes sense to confront that model directly with the
data. Nevertheless, our procedure is useful in analyzing models with many fric-
tions. For example, some researchers, such as Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) and Christiano, Gust, and Roldos (2004), have argued that the data are
well accounted for by models that include a host of frictions (such as credit
market frictions, sticky wages, and sticky prices). Our analysis suggests that
the features of these models that primarily lead to investment wedges can be
dropped with only a modest effect on the models’ ability to account for the
data.
Our work here is related to a vast business cycle literature that we discuss in
detail after we describe and apply our new method.
1. DEMONSTRATING THE EQUIVALENCE RESULT
Here we show how various detailed models that have underlying distortions
are equivalent to a prototype growth model that has one or more wedges.
1.1. The Benchmark Prototype Economy
The benchmark prototype economy that we use later in our accounting pro-
cedure is a stochastic growth model. In each period t, the economy experi-
ences one of finitely many events st , which index the shocks. We denote by
st = (s0     st) the history of events up through and including period t, and
often refer to st as the state. The probability, as of period 0, of any particular
history st is πt(st). The initial realization s0 is given. The economy has four
exogenous stochastic variables, all of which are functions of the underlying
random variable st : the efficiency wedge At(st), the labor wedge 1 − τlt(st), the
investment wedge 1/[1 + τxt(st)], and the government consumption wedge gt(st).
In the model, consumers maximize expected utility over per capita consump-
tion ct and per capita labor lt ,
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtπt(s
t)U(ct(s
t) lt(s
t))Nt
subject to the budget constraint
ct + [1 + τxt(st)]xt(st)
= [1 − τlt(st)]wt(st)lt(st)+ rt(st)kt(st−1)+ Tt(st)
786 V. V. CHARI, P. J. KEHOE, AND E. R. MCGRATTAN
and the capital accumulation law
(1 + γn)kt+1(st)= (1 − δ)kt(st−1)+ xt(st)(1)
where kt(st−1) denotes the per capita capital stock, xt(st) is per capita invest-
ment, wt(st) is the wage rate, rt(st) is the rental rate on capital, β is the discount
factor, δ is the depreciation rate of capital, Nt is the population with growth
rate equal to 1 + γn, and Tt(st) is per capita lump-sum transfers.
The production function is A(st)F(kt(st−1) (1 + γ)tlt(st)), where 1 + γ is
the rate of labor-augmenting technical progress, which is assumed to be a
constant. Firms maximize profits given by At(st)F(kt(st−1) (1 + γ)tlt(st)) −
rt(s
t)kt(s
t−1)−wt(st)lt(st).
The equilibrium of this benchmark prototype economy is summarized by the
resource constraint
ct(s
t)+ xt(st)+ gt(st)= yt(st)(2)
where yt(st) denotes per capita output, together with
yt(s
t)=At(st)F(kt(st−1) (1 + γ)tlt(st))(3)
−Ult(s
t)
Uct(st)
= [1 − τlt(st)]At(st)(1 + γ)tFlt(4)
and
Uct(s
t)[1 + τxt(st)](5)
= β
∑
st+1
πt(s
t+1|st)Uct+1(st+1)
× {At+1(st+1)Fkt+1(st+1)+ (1 − δ)[1 + τxt+1(st+1)]}
where, here and throughout, notations like Uct , Ult , Flt , and Fkt denote
the derivatives of the utility function and the production function with re-
spect to their arguments, and πt(st+1|st) denotes the conditional probability
πt(s
t+1)/πt(st). We assume that gt(st) fluctuates around a trend of (1 + γ)t .
Notice that in this benchmark prototype economy, the efficiency wedge re-
sembles a blueprint technology parameter, and the labor wedge and the invest-
ment wedge resemble tax rates on labor income and investment. Other more
elaborate models could be considered, such as models with other kinds of fric-
tions that look like taxes on consumption or on capital income. Consumption
taxes induce a wedge between the consumption–leisure marginal rate of sub-
stitution and the marginal product of labor in the same way as do labor income
taxes. Such taxes, if they are time-varying, also distort the intertemporal mar-
gins in (5). Capital income taxes induce a wedge between the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of capital that is only
BUSINESS CYCLE ACCOUNTING 787
slightly different from the distortion induced by a tax on investment. We ex-
perimented with intertemporal distortions that resemble capital income taxes
rather than investment taxes and found that our substantive conclusions are
unaffected. (For details, see Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2006), hereafter
referred to as the technical appendix.)
We emphasize that each of the wedges represents the overall distortion to
the relevant equilibrium condition of the model. For example, distortions both
to labor supply affecting consumers and to labor demand affecting firms dis-
tort the static first-order condition (4). Our labor wedge represents the sum
of these distortions. Thus, our method identifies the overall wedge induced by
both distortions and does not identify each separately. Likewise, liquidity con-
straints on consumers distort the consumer’s intertemporal Euler equation,
while investment financing frictions on firms distort the firm’s intertemporal
Euler equation. Our method combines the Euler equations for the consumer
and the firm, and, therefore, identifies only the overall wedge in the combined
Euler equation given by (5). We focus on the overall wedges because what mat-
ters in determining business cycle fluctuations is the overall wedges, not each
distortion separately.
1.2. The Mapping—From Frictions to Wedges
Now we illustrate the mapping between detailed economies and prototype
economies for two types of wedges. We show that input-financing frictions in a
detailed economy map into efficiency wedges in our prototype economy. Sticky
wages in a monetary economy map into our prototype (real) economy with la-
bor wedges. In the Appendix, we show as well that investment-financing fric-
tions map into investment wedges and that fluctuations in net exports in an
open economy map into government consumption wedges in our prototype
(closed) economy. In general, our approach is to show that the frictions asso-
ciated with specific economic environments manifest themselves as distortions
in first-order conditions and resource constraints in a growth model. We refer
to these distortions as wedges.
We choose simple models so as to illustrate how the detailed models map
into the prototypes. Because many models map into the same configuration
of wedges, identifying one particular configuration does not uniquely identify
a model; rather, it identifies a whole class of models consistent with that con-
figuration. In this sense, our method does not uniquely determine the model
that is most promising to analyze business cycle fluctuations. It does, however,
guide researchers to focus on the key margins that need to be distorted so as
to capture the nature of the fluctuations.
A. Efficiency wedges
In many economies, underlying frictions either within or across firms cause
factor inputs to be used inefficiently. These frictions in an underlying economy
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often show up as aggregate productivity shocks in a prototype economy similar
to our benchmark economy. Schmitz (2005) presented an interesting example
of within-firm frictions that resulted from work rules that lower measured pro-
ductivity at the firm level. Lagos (2006) studied how labor market policies lead
to misallocations of labor across firms and, thus, to lower aggregate productiv-
ity. Chu (2001) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2003) showed how government
policies at the levels of plants and establishments lead to lower aggregate pro-
ductivity.
Here we develop a detailed economy with input-financing frictions and use it
to make two points. This economy illustrates the general idea that frictions that
lead to inefficient factor utilization map into efficiency wedges in a prototype
economy. Beyond that, however, the economy also demonstrates that financial
frictions can show up as efficiency wedges rather than as investment wedges. In
our detailed economy, financing frictions lead some firms to pay higher interest
rates for working capital than do other firms. Thus, these frictions lead to an
inefficient allocation of inputs across firms.
i. A detailed economy with input-financing frictions. Consider a simple de-
tailed economy with financing frictions that distort the allocation of interme-
diate inputs across two types of firms. Both types of firms must borrow to pay
for an intermediate input in advance of production. One type of firm is more
financially constrained in the sense that it pays a higher interest rate on bor-
rowing than does the other type. We think of these frictions as capturing the
idea that some firms, such as small firms, often have difficulty borrowing. One
motivation for the higher interest rate faced by the financially constrained firms
is that moral hazard problems are more severe for small firms.
Specifically, consider the following economy. Aggregate gross output qt is a
combination of the gross output qit from the economy’s two sectors, indexed
i = 12, where 1 indicates the sector of firms that are more financially con-
strained and 2 denotes the sector of firms that are less financially constrained.
The sectors’ gross output is combined according to
qt = qφ1tq1−φ2t (6)
where 0 < φ < 1. The representative producer of the gross output qt chooses
q1t and q2t to solve this problem,
maxqt −p1tq1t −p2tq2t 
subject to (6), where pit is the price of the output of sector i.
The resource constraint for gross output in this economy is
ct + kt+1 +m1t +m2t = qt + (1 − δ)kt(7)
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where ct is consumption, kt is the capital stock, and m1t and m2t are intermedi-
ate goods used in sectors 1 and 2, respectively. Final output, given by yt = qt−
m1t− m2t , is gross output less the intermediate goods used.
The gross output of each sector i, qit , is made from intermediate goods mit
and a composite value-added good zit according to
qit =mθitz1−θit (8)
where 0 < θ< 1. The composite value-added good is produced from capital kt
and labor lt according to
z1t + z2t = zt = F(kt lt)(9)
The producer of gross output of sector i chooses the composite good zit and
the intermediate good mit to solve this problem,
maxpitqit − vtzit −Ritmit
subject to (8). Here vt is the price of the composite good and Rit is the gross
within-period interest rate paid on borrowing by firms in sector i. If firms in
sector 1 are more financially constrained than those in sector 2, then R1t > R2t .
Let Rit =Rt(1+τit), where Rt is the rate consumers earn within period t and τit
measures the within-period spread, induced by financing constraints, between
the rate paid to consumers who save and the rate paid by firms in sector i.
Because consumers do not discount utility within the period, Rt = 1.
In this economy, the representative producer of the composite good zt
chooses kt and lt to solve this problem,
maxvtzt −wtlt − rtkt
subject to (9), where wt is the wage rate and rt is the rental rate on capital.
Consumers solve this problem,
max
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct lt)(10)
subject to
ct + kt+1 = rtkt +wtlt + (1 − δ)kt + Tt
where lt = l1t + l2t is the economy’s total labor supply and Tt = Rt∑i τitmit
denotes lump-sum transfers. Here we assume that the financing frictions act
like distorting taxes and the proceeds are rebated to consumers. If, instead, we
assumed that these frictions represent, say, lost gross output, then we would
adjust the economy’s resource constraint (7) appropriately.
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ii. The associated prototype economy with efficiency wedges. Now consider
a version of the benchmark prototype economy that will have the same ag-
gregate allocations as the input-financing frictions economy just detailed. This
prototype economy is identical to our benchmark prototype except that the
new prototype economy has an investment wedge that resembles a tax on capi-
tal income rather than a tax on investment. Here the government consumption
wedge is set equal to zero.
Now the consumer’s budget constraint is
ct + kt+1 = (1 − τkt)rtkt + (1 − τlt)wtlt + (1 − δ)kt + Tt(11)
and the efficiency wedge is
At = κ(a1−φ1t aφ2t)θ/(1−θ)[1 − θ(a1t + a2t)](12)
where a1t = φ/(1 + τ1t), a2t = (1 − φ)/(1 + τ2t), κ = [φφ(1 − φ)1−φθθ]1/(1−θ),
and τ1t and τ2t are the interest rate spreads in the detailed economy.
Comparing the first-order conditions in the detailed economy with input-
financing frictions to those of the associated prototype economy with efficiency
wedges leads immediately to the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1: Consider a prototype economy that has resource constraint (2)
and consumer budget constraint (11) that has exogenous processes for the effi-
ciency wedge At given in (12), the labor wedge given by
1
1 − τlt =
1
1 − θ
[
1 − θ
(
φ
1 + τ∗1t
+ 1 −φ
1 + τ∗2t
)]
(13)
and the investment wedge given by τkt = τlt , where τ∗1t and τ∗2t are the interest rate
spreads from the detailed economy with input-financing frictions. Then the equi-
librium allocations for aggregate variables in the detailed economy are equilibrium
allocations in this prototype economy.
Consider the following special case of Proposition 1 in which only the effi-
ciency wedge fluctuates. Specifically, suppose that in the detailed economy the
interest rate spreads τ1t and τ2t fluctuate over time, but in such a way that the
weighted average of these spreads,
a1t + a2t = φ1 + τ1t +
1 −φ
1 + τ2t (14)
is constant while a1−φ1t a
φ
2t fluctuates. Then from (13) we see that the labor and
investment wedges are constant, and from (12) we see that the efficiency wedge
fluctuates. In this case, on average, financing frictions are unchanged, but rel-
ative distortions fluctuate. An outside observer who attempted to fit the data
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generated by the detailed economy with input-financing frictions to the proto-
type economy would identify the fluctuations in relative distortions with fluc-
tuations in technology and would see no fluctuations in either the labor wedge
1 − τlt or the investment wedge τkt . In particular, periods in which the rela-
tive distortions increase would be misinterpreted as periods of technological
regress.
B. Labor wedges
Now we show that a monetary economy with sticky wages is equivalent to
a (real) prototype economy with labor wedges. In the detailed economy, the
shocks are to monetary policy, while in the prototype economy, the shocks are
to the labor wedge.
i. A detailed economy with sticky wages. Consider a monetary economy pop-
ulated by a large number of identical, infinitely lived consumers. The economy
consists of a competitive final goods producer and a continuum of monopolis-
tically competitive unions that set their nominal wages in advance of the re-
alization of shocks to the economy. Each union represents all consumers who
supply a specific type of labor.
In each period t, the commodities in this economy are a consumption–capital
good, money, and a continuum of differentiated types of labor, indexed by j
∈ [01]. The technology for producing final goods from capital and a labor
aggregate at history, or state, st has constant returns to scale and is given by
y(st)= F(k(st−1) l(st)), where y(st) is output of the final good, k(st−1) is cap-
ital, and
l(st)=
[∫
l(j st)v dj
]1/v
(15)
is an aggregate of the differentiated types of labor l(j st).
The final goods producer in this economy behaves competitively. This pro-
ducer has some initial capital stock k(s−1) and accumulates capital according
to k(st) = (1 − δ)k(st−1) + x(st), where x(st) is investment. The present dis-
counted value of profits for this producer is
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
Q(st)[P(st)y(st)− P(st)x(st)−W (st−1)l(st)](16)
where Q(st) is the price of a dollar at st in an abstract unit of account, P(st) is
the dollar price of final goods at st , and W (st−1) is the aggregate nominal wage
at st , which depends on only st−1 because of wage stickiness.
The producer’s problem can be stated in two parts. First, the producer
chooses sequences for capital k(st−1), investment x(st), and aggregate labor
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l(st) so as to maximize (16) given the production function and the capital ac-
cumulation law. The first-order conditions can be summarized by
P(st)Fl(s
t)=W (st−1)(17)
and
Q(st)P(st)=
∑
st+1
Q(st+1)P(st+1)[Fk(st+1)+ 1 − δ](18)
Second, for any given amount of aggregate labor l(st), the producer’s demand
for each type of differentiated labor is given by the solution to
min
{l(jst )}
j∈[01]
∫
W (j st−1)l(j st) dj(19)
subject to (15); here W (j st−1) is the nominal wage for differentiated labor of
type j. Nominal wages are set by unions before the realization of the event in
period t; thus, wages depend on, at most, st−1. The demand for labor of type j
by the final goods producer is
ld(j st)=
[
W (st−1)
W (j st−1)
]1/(1−v)
l(st)(20)
where W (st−1) ≡ [∫ W (j st−1)v/(v−1) dj](v−1)/v is the aggregate nominal wage.
The minimized value in (19) is, thus, W (st−1)l(st).
In this economy, consumers can be thought of as being organized into a
continuum of unions indexed by j. Each union consists of all the consumers in
the economy with labor of type j. Each union realizes that it faces a downward-
sloping demand for its type of labor, given by (20). In each period, the new
wages are set before the realization of the economy’s current shocks.
The preferences of a representative consumer in the jth union are
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtπt(s
t)
[
U(c(j st) l(j st))+ V (M(j st)/P(st))](21)
where c(j st), l(j st), and M(j st) are the consumption, labor supply, and
money holdings of this consumer, and P(st) is the economy’s overall price
level. Note that the utility function is separable in real balances. This economy
has complete markets for state-contingent nominal claims. The asset structure
is represented by a set of complete, contingent, one-period nominal bonds.
Let B(j st+1) denote the consumers’ holdings of such a bond purchased in
period t at history st , with payoffs contingent on some particular event st+1
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in t + 1, where st+1 = (st st+1). One unit of this bond pays one dollar in pe-
riod t + 1 if the particular event st+1 occurs and pays zero otherwise. Let
Q(st+1|st) denote the dollar price of this bond in period t at history st , where
Q(st+1|st)=Q(st+1)/Q(st).
The problem of the jth union is to maximize (21) subject to the budget con-
straint
P(st)c(j st)+M(j st)+
∑
st+1
Q(st+1|st)B(j st+1)
≤W (j st−1)l(j st)+M(j st−1)+B(j st)+ P(st)T (st)+D(st)
the constraint l(j st) = ld(j st), and the borrowing constraint B(st+1) ≥
−P(st)b, where ld(j st) is given by (20). Here T(st) denotes transfers and
the positive constant b constrains the amount of real borrowing by the union.
Also, D(st)= P(st)y(st)− P(st)x(st)−W (st−1)l(st) are the dividends paid by
the firms. The initial conditions M(j s−1) and B(j s0) are given and assumed
to be the same for all j. Notice that in this problem, the union chooses the
wage and agrees to supply whatever labor is demanded at that wage.
The first-order conditions for this problem can be summarized by
Vm(j s
t)
P(st)
− Uc(j s
t)
P(st)
+β
∑
st+1
π(st+1|st)Uc(j s
t+1)
P(st+1)
= 0(22)
Q(st |st−1)= βπt(st |st−1) Uc(j s
t)
Uc(j st−1)
P(st−1)
P(st)
(23)
and
W (j st−1)= −
∑
st Q(s
t)P(st)Ul(j s
t)/Uc(j s
t)ld(j st)
v
∑
st Q(s
t)ld(j st)
(24)
Here πt(st+1|st)= πt(st+1)/πt(st) is the conditional probability of st+1 given st .
Notice that in a steady state, (24) reduces to W/P = (1/v)(−Ul/Uc), so that
real wages are set as a markup over the marginal rate of substitution between
labor and consumption. Given the symmetry among the unions, all of them
choose the same consumption, labor, money balances, bond holdings, and
wages, which are denoted simply by c(st), l(st), M(st), B(st+1), and W (st).
Consider next the specification of the money supply process and the market-
clearing conditions for this sticky-wage economy. The nominal money supply
process is given by M(st) = µ(st)M(st−1), where µ(st) is a stochastic process.
New money balances are distributed to consumers in a lump-sum fashion by
having nominal transfers satisfy P(st)T (st) = M(st) − M(st−1). The resource
constraint for this economy is c(st)+k(st)= y(st)+ (1−δ)k(st−1). Bond mar-
ket clearing requires that B(st+1)= 0.
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ii. The associated prototype economy with labor wedges. Consider now a real
prototype economy with labor wedges and the production function for final
goods given above in the detailed economy with sticky wages. The representa-
tive firm maximizes (16) subject to the capital accumulation law given above.
The first-order conditions can be summarized by (17) and (18). The represen-
tative consumer maximizes
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtπt(s
t)U(c(st) l(st))
subject to the budget constraint
c(st)+
∑
st+1
q(st+1|st)b(st+1)
≤ [1 − τl(st)]w(st)l(st)+ b(st)+ v(st)+ d(st)
with w(st) replacing W (st−1)/P(st) and q(st+1/st) replacing Q(st+1)P(st+1)/
Q(st)P(st) and a bound on real bond holdings, where the lowercase letters
qbwv, and d denote the real values of bond prices, debt, wages, lump-sum
transfers, and dividends. Here the first-order condition for bonds is identi-
cal to that in (23) once symmetry has been imposed with q(st/st−1) replacing
Q(st/st−1)P(st)/P(st−1). The first-order condition for labor is given by
−Ul(s
t)
Uc(st)
= [1 − τl(st)]w(st)
Consider an equilibrium of the sticky-wage economy for some given stochas-
tic process M∗(st) on money supply. Denote all of the allocations and prices
in this equilibrium with asterisks. Then the following proposition can be easily
established:
PROPOSITION 2: Consider the prototype economy just described with labor
wedges given by
1 − τl(st)= −U
∗
l (s
t)
U∗c (st)
1
F∗l (st)
(25)
where U∗l (s
t), U∗c (s
t), and F∗l (s
t) are evaluated at the equilibrium of the sticky-
wage economy and where real transfers are equal to the real value of transfers in
the sticky-wage economy adjusted for the interest cost of holding money. Then the
equilibrium allocations and prices in the sticky-wage economy are the same as
those in the prototype economy.
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The proof of this proposition is immediate from comparing the first-order
conditions, the budget constraints, and the resource constraints for the proto-
type economy with labor wedges to those of the detailed economy with sticky
wages. The key idea is that distortions in the sticky-wage economy between
the marginal product of labor implicit in (24) and the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between leisure and consumption are perfectly captured by the labor
wedges (25) in the prototype economy.
2. THE ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE
Having established our equivalence result, we now describe our accounting
procedure at a conceptual level and discuss a Markovian implementation of it.
Our procedure is to conduct experiments that isolate the marginal effect of
each wedge as well as the marginal effects of combinations of these wedges
on aggregate variables. In the experiment in which we isolate the marginal
effect of the efficiency wedge, for example, we hold the other wedges fixed at
some constant values in all periods. In conducting this experiment, we ensure
that the probability distribution of the efficiency wedge coincides with that in
the prototype economy. In effect, we ensure that agents’ expectations of how
the efficiency wedge will evolve are the same as in the prototype economy. For
each experiment, we compare the properties of the resulting equilibria to those
of the prototype economy. These comparisons, together with our equivalence
results, allow us to identify promising classes of detailed economies.
2.1. The Accounting Procedure at a Conceptual Level
Suppose for now that the stochastic process πt(st) and the realizations of
the state st in some particular episode are known. Recall that the prototype
economy has one underlying (vector-valued) random variable, the state st ,
which has a probability of πt(st). All of the other stochastic variables, includ-
ing the four wedges—the efficiency wedge At(st), the labor wedge 1 − τlt(st),
the investment wedge 1/[1 + τxt(st)], and the government consumption wedge
gt(s
t)—are simply functions of this random variable. Hence, when the state st
is known, so are the wedges.
To evaluate the effects of just the efficiency wedge, for example, we con-
sider an economy, referred to as an efficiency wedge alone economy, with the
same underlying state st , the same probability πt(st), and the same function
At(s
t) for the efficiency wedge as in the prototype economy, but in which the
other three wedges are set to constants, that is, τlt(st) = τ¯l τxt(st) = τ¯x, and
gt(s
t)= g¯. Note that this construction ensures that the probability distribution
of the efficiency wedge in this economy is identical to that in the prototype
economy.
For the efficiency wedge alone economy, we then compute the equilibrium
outcomes associated with the realizations of the state st in a particular episode
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and compare these outcomes to those of the economy with all four wedges.
We find this comparison to be of particular interest because, in our applica-
tions, the realizations st are such that the economy with all four wedges exactly
reproduces the data on output, labor, investment, and consumption.
In a similar manner, we define the labor wedge alone economy, the investment
wedge alone economy, and the government consumption wedge alone economy,
as well as economies with a combination of wedges such as the efficiency and
labor wedge economy.
2.2. A Markovian Implementation
So far we have described our procedure under the assumption that we know
the stochastic process πt(st) and that we can observe the state st . In practice,
of course, we need either to specify the stochastic process a priori or to use
data to estimate it, and we need to uncover the state st from the data. Here we
describe a set of assumptions that makes these efforts easy. Then we describe
in detail the three steps involved in implementing our procedure.
We assume that the state st follows a Markov process of the form π(st |st−1)
and that the wedges in period t can be used to uncover the event st uniquely,
in the sense that the mapping from the event st to the wedges (At τlt τxt gt)
is one to one and onto. Given this assumption, without loss of generality, let
the underlying event st = (sAt slt sxt sgt), and let At(st) = sAt , τlt(st) = slt ,
τxt(s
t)= sxt , and gt(st)= sgt . Note that we have effectively assumed that agents
use only past wedges to forecast future wedges and that the wedges in period t
are sufficient statistics for the event in period t.
The first step in our procedure is to use data on yt , lt , xt , and gt from an
actual economy to estimate the parameters of the Markov process π(st |st−1).
We can do so using a variety of methods, including the maximum likelihood
procedure described below.
The second step in our procedure is to uncover the event st by measuring
the realized wedges. We measure the government consumption wedge directly
from the data as the sum of government spending and net exports. To obtain
the values of the other three wedges, we use the data and the model’s decision
rules. With ydt , l
d
t , x
d
t , g
d
t , and k
d
0 denoting the data, and y(stkt), l(stkt), and
x(stkt) denoting the decision rules of the model, the realized wedge series sdt
solves
ydt = y(sdt kt) ldt = l(sdt kt) and xdt = x(sdt kt)(26)
with kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + xdt , k0 = kd0 , and gt = gdt . Note that we construct a
series for the capital stock using the capital accumulation law (1), data on in-
vestment xt , and an initial choice of capital stock k0. In effect, we solve for the
three unknown elements of the vector st using the three equations (3)–(5) and
thereby uncover the state. We use the associated values for the wedges in our
experiments.
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Note that the four wedges account for all of the movement in output, labor,
investment, and government consumption, in that if we feed the four wedges
into the three decision rules in (26) and use gt(sdt ) = sgt along with the law of
motion for capital, we simply recover the original data.
Note also that in measuring the realized wedges, the estimated stochastic
process plays a role in measuring only the investment wedge. To see that the
stochastic process does not play a role in measuring the efficiency and labor
wedges, note that these wedges can equivalently be directly calculated from
(3) and (4) without computing the equilibrium of the model. In contrast, calcu-
lating the investment wedge requires computing the equilibrium of the model
because the right side of (5) has expectations over future values of consump-
tion, the capital stock, the wedges, and so on. The equilibrium of the model
depends on these expectations and, therefore, on the stochastic process driving
the wedges.
The third step in our procedure is to conduct experiments to isolate the mar-
ginal effects of the wedges. To do that, we allow a subset of the wedges to fluc-
tuate as they do in the data while the others are set to constants. To evaluate
the effects of the efficiency wedge, we compute the decision rules for the ef-
ficiency wedge alone economy, denoted ye(stkt) le(stkt), and xe(stkt), in
which At(st) = sAt τlt(st) = τ¯l τxt(st) = τ¯x, and gt(st) = g¯. Starting from kd0 ,
we then use sdt , the decision rules, and the capital accumulation law to compute
the realized sequence of output, labor, and investment, yet  l
e
t , and x
e
t , which we
call the efficiency wedge components of output, labor, and investment. We com-
pare these components to output, labor, and investment in the data. Other
components are computed and compared similarly.
Notice that in this experiment we computed the decision rules for an econ-
omy in which only one wedge fluctuates and the others are set to be constants
in all events. The fluctuations in the one wedge are driven by fluctuations in a
4 dimensional state st .
Notice also that our experiments are designed to separate out the direct ef-
fect and the forecasting effect of fluctuations in wedges. As a wedge fluctuates,
it directly affects either budget constraints or resource constraints. This fluctu-
ation also affects the forecasts of that wedge as well as of other wedges in the
future. Our experiments are designed so that when we hold a particular wedge
constant, we eliminate the direct effect of that wedge, but we retain its fore-
casting effect on the other wedges. By doing so, we ensure that expectations of
the fluctuating wedges are identical to those in the prototype economy.
Here we focus on one simple way to specify the expectations of agents: as-
sume they simply use past values of the wedges to forecast future values. An
extension of our Markovian procedure is to use past endogenous variables,
such as output, investment, consumption, and perhaps even asset prices such
as stock market values, in addition to past wedges to forecast future wedges.
Another approach is simply to specify these expectations directly, as we did in
our earlier work (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002)) and then conduct a
798 V. V. CHARI, P. J. KEHOE, AND E. R. MCGRATTAN
variety of experiments to determine how the results change as the specification
is changed.
3. APPLYING THE ACCOUNTING APPLICATION
Now we demonstrate how to apply our accounting procedure to two U.S.
business cycle episodes: the Great Depression and the postwar recession of
1982. We then extend our analysis to the entire postwar period. (In the techni-
cal appendix, we describe in detail our data sources, parameter choices, com-
putational methods, and estimation procedures.)
3.1. Details of the Application
To apply our accounting procedure, we use functional forms and parameter
values that are familiar from the business cycle literature. We assume that the
production function has the form F(k l) = kαl1−α and the utility function has
the form U(c l)= log c+ψ log(1− l). We choose the capital share α= 35 and
the time allocation parameter ψ= 224. We choose the depreciation rate δ, the
discount factor β, and growth rates γ and γn so that, on an annualized basis,
depreciation is 4.64%, the rate of time preference is 3%, the population growth
rate is 1.5%, and the growth of technology is 1.6%.
To estimate the stochastic process for the state, we first specify a vector au-
toregressive AR(1) process for the event st = (sAt slt sxt sgt) of the form
st+1 = P0 + Pst + εt+1(27)
where the shock εt is independent and identically distributed over time and is
distributed normally with mean zero and covariance matrix V . To ensure that
our estimate of V is positive semidefinite, we estimate the lower triangular
matrix Q, where V = QQ′. The matrix Q has no structural interpretation. (In
Section 5, we elaborate on the contrast between our decomposition and more
traditional decompositions that impose structural interpretations on Q.)
We then use a standard maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the pa-
rameters P0P , and V of the vector AR(1) process for the wedges. In doing
so, we use the log-linear decision rules of the prototype economy and data on
output, labor, investment, and the sum of government consumption and net
exports.
For our Great Depression experiments, we proceed as follows. We discretize
the process (27) and simulate the economy using nonlinear decision rules from
a finite-element method. We use nonlinear decision rules in these experiments
because the shocks are so large that, for a given stochastic process, the linear
decision rules are a poor approximation to the nonlinear decision rules. Of
course, we would rather have used the nonlinear decision rules to estimate the
parameters of the vector AR(1) process. We do not do so because this exercise
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is computationally demanding. Instead we experiment by varying the parame-
ters of the vector AR(1) process and find that our results are very similar across
these experiments.
For our postwar experiments, we use the log-linear decision rules and the
continuous state process (27).
To implement our accounting procedure, we must first adjust the data to
make them consistent with the theory. In particular, we adjust the U.S. data on
output and its components to remove sales taxes and to add the service flow for
consumer durables. For the pre-World War II period, we remove military com-
pensation as well. We estimate separate sets of parameters for the stochastic
process for wedges (27) for each of our two historical episodes. The other pa-
rameters are the same in the two episodes. (See our technical appendix for our
rationale for this decision.) The stochastic process parameters for the Great
Depression analysis are estimated using annual data for 1901–1940; those for
analysis after World War II use quarterly data for 1959:1–2004:3. In the Great
Depression analysis, we impose the additional restriction that the covariance
between the shocks to the government consumption wedge and those to the
other wedges is zero. This restriction avoids having the large movements in
government consumption associated with World War I dominate the estima-
tion of the stochastic process.
Table I displays the resulting estimated values for the parameters of the co-
efficient matrices, P and Q, and the associated confidence bands for our two
historical data periods. The stochastic process (27) with these values will be
used by agents in our economy to form their expectations about future wedges.
3.2. Findings
Now we describe the results of applying our procedure to two historical
U.S. business cycle episodes. In the Great Depression, the efficiency and la-
bor wedges play a central role for all variables considered. In the 1982 reces-
sion, the efficiency wedge plays a central role for output and investment, while
the labor wedge plays a central role for labor. The government consumption
wedge plays no role in either period; most strikingly, neither does the invest-
ment wedge.
In reporting our findings, we remove a trend of 1.6% from output, invest-
ment, and the government consumption wedge. Both output and labor are nor-
malized to equal 100 in the base periods: 1929 for the Great Depression and
1979:1 for the 1982 recession. In both of these historical episodes, investment
(detrended) is divided by the base period level of output. Because the govern-
ment consumption component accounts for virtually none of the fluctuations in
output, labor, and investment, we discuss the government consumption wedge
and its components only in our technical appendix. Here we focus primarily on
the fluctuations due to the efficiency, labor, and investment wedges.
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TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF THE VECTOR AR(1) STOCHASTIC PROCESS IN TWO HISTORICAL EPISODESa
(ESTIMATED USING MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD WITH U.S. DATAb)
Coefficient Matrix P on Lagged States Coefficient Matrix Q, Where V =QQ′
A. Annual Data, 1901–1940

732 0521 −317 0
(470 856) (−0364 142) (−716 130)
−150 104 390 0
(−339 0504) (908110) (−0751 782)
−0114 −0197 0731 0
(−384 260) (−262 126) (−363 296)
0 0 0 750
(424 814)




0575 0 0 0
(0440 0666)
−00561 0555 0 0
(−0216 00952) (0378 0643)
000299 −000253 0369 0
(−0308 0230) (−0167 0121) (0194 0489)
0 0 0 221
(145 276)


Means of states = [541 (503 591)−190 (−271−0867) 286 (216 364)−279 (−295−255)]
B. Quarterly Data, 1959:1–2004:3

980 −0138 −0117 0192
(944 984) (−0192 00222) (−0129−00605) (0125 0259)
−0330 956 −0451 0569
(−0396−0061) (920 959) (−0512−0286) (0473 0677)
−0702 −0460 896 104
(−1087−0672) (−0612−0304) (879 907) (0817 112)
00481 −00811 0488 971
(−0278 0116) (−0158 0157) (0371 0643) (954 974)




0116 0 0 0
(0105 0126)
00141 00644 0 0
(000462 00232) (00567 00695)
−0105 00103 0158 0
(−0141−00779) (−00278 00266) (0133 0190)
−000575 00611 0142 00458
(−00219 00132) (00383 00760) (0121 0154) (00386 00554)


Means of states = [−0239 (−0301−0137) 328 (322 336) 483 (473 495)−153 (−155−152)]
aTo ensure stationarity, we add to the likelihood function a penalty term proportional to max(|λmax| − 9950)2, where λmax is the maximal eigenvalue of P . Numbers in
parentheses are 90% confidence intervals for a bootstrapped distribution with 500 replications. To ensure that the variance–covariance matrix V is positive semidefinite, we
estimate Q rather than V =QQ′ .
bFor the sources of basic data, see Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2006).
BUSINESS CYCLE ACCOUNTING 801
A. The Great Depression
Our findings for the period 1929–1939, which includes the Great Depres-
sion, are displayed in Figures 1–4. In sum, we find that the efficiency and la-
bor wedges account for essentially all of the movements of output, labor, and
investment in the Depression period and that the investment wedge actually
drives output the wrong way.
In Figure 1, we display actual U.S. output along with the three measured
wedges for that period: the efficiency wedge A, the labor wedge (1 − τl), and
the investment wedge 1/(1 + τx). We see that the underlying distortions re-
vealed by the three wedges have different patterns. The distortions that mani-
fest themselves as efficiency and labor wedges become substantially worse be-
tween 1929 and 1933. By 1939, the efficiency wedge has returned to the 1929
trend level, but the labor wedge has not. Over the period, the investment wedge
fluctuates, but investment decisions are generally less distorted, in the sense
that τx is smaller between 1932 and 1939 than it is in 1929. Note that this
investment wedge pattern does not square with models of business cycles in
which financial frictions increase in downturns and decrease in recoveries.
In Figure 2, we plot the 1929–1939 data for U.S. output, labor, and invest-
ment along with the model’s predictions for those variables when the model
includes just one wedge. In terms of the data, note that labor declines 27%
FIGURE 1.—U.S. output and three measured wedges (annually; normalized to equal 100
in 1929).
802 V. V. CHARI, P. J. KEHOE, AND E. R. MCGRATTAN
FIGURE 2.—Data and predictions of the models with just one wedge.
from 1929 to 1933 and stays relatively low for the rest of the decade. Invest-
ment also declines sharply from 1929 to 1933, but partially recovers by the end
of the decade. Interestingly, in an algebraic sense, about half of output’s 36%
fall from 1929 to 1933 is due to the decline in investment.
In terms of the model, we start by assessing the separate contributions of the
three wedges.
Consider first the contribution of the efficiency wedge. In Figure 2, we see
that with this wedge alone, the model predicts that output declines less than
it actually does in the data and that it recovers more rapidly. For example,
by 1933, predicted output falls about 30%, while U.S. output falls about 36%.
Thus, the efficiency wedge accounts for over 80% of the decline of output in
the data. By 1939, predicted output is only about 6% below trend rather than
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the observed 22%. As can also be seen in Figure 2, the reason for this predicted
rapid recovery is that the efficiency wedge accounts for only a small part of
the observed movements in labor in the data. By 1933, the fall in predicted
investment is similar to but somewhat greater than that in the data; it recovers
faster, however.
Consider next the contributions of the labor wedge. In Figure 2, we see that
with this wedge alone, the model predicts output due to the labor wedge to
fall by 1933 a little less than half as much as output falls in the data: 16% vs.
36%. By 1939, however, the labor wedge model’s predicted output completely
captures the slow recovery: it predicts output falling 21%, approximately as
much as output does that year in the data. This model captures the slow out-
put recovery because predicted labor due to the labor wedge also captures the
sluggishness in labor after 1933 remarkably well. The associated prediction for
investment is a decline, but not the actual sharp decline from 1929 to 1933.
Summarizing Figure 2, we can say that the efficiency wedge accounts for over
three-quarters of output’s downturn during the Great Depression but misses
its slow recovery, while the labor wedge accounts for about one-half of this
downturn and essentially all of the slow recovery.
Now consider the investment wedge. In Figure 3, we again plot the data for
output, labor, and investment, but this time along with the contributions to
those variables that the model predicts are due to the investment wedge alone.
This figure demonstrates that the investment wedge’s contributions completely
miss the observed movements in all three variables. The investment wedge ac-
tually leads output to rise by about 9% by 1933.
Together, then, Figures 2 and 3 suggest that the efficiency and labor wedges
account for essentially all of the movements of output, labor, and investment
in the Depression period and that the investment wedge accounts for almost
none. This suggestion is confirmed by Figure 4, where we plot the combined
contribution from the efficiency, labor, and (insignificant) government con-
sumption wedges (labeled Model With No Investment Wedge). As can be seen
from the figure, essentially all of the fluctuations in output, labor, and invest-
ment can be accounted for by movements in the efficiency and labor wedges.
For comparison, we also plot the combined contribution due to the labor, in-
vestment, and government consumption wedges (labeled Model With No Ef-
ficiency Wedge). This combination does not do well. In fact, comparing Fig-
ures 2 and 4, we see that the model with this combination is further from the
data than the model with the labor wedge component alone.
One issue of possible concern with our findings about the role of the invest-
ment wedge is that measuring it is subtler than measuring the other wedges.
Recall that measurement of this wedge depends on the details of the stochastic
process that governs the wedges, whereas the size of the other wedges can be
inferred from static equilibrium conditions. To address this concern, we con-
duct an additional experiment intended to give the model with no efficiency
wedge the best chance to account for the data.
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FIGURE 3.—Data and predictions of the model with just the investment wedge.
In this experiment, we choose the investment wedge to be as large as it needs
to be for investment in the model to be as close as possible to investment in the
data, and we set the other wedges to be constants. Predictions of this model,
which we call the Model With Maximum Investment Wedge, turn out to match
the behavior of consumption in the data poorly. For example, from 1929 to
1933, consumption in the model rises more than 8% relative to trend, while
consumption in the data declines about 28%. (For details, see the technical
appendix.) We label this poor performance the consumption anomaly of the
investment wedge model.
Altogether, these findings lead us to conclude that distortions that manifest
themselves primarily as investment wedges played essentially no useful role in
the U.S. Great Depression.
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FIGURE 4.—Data and predictions of the models with all wedges but one.
B. The 1982 recession
Now we apply our accounting procedure to a more typical U.S. business
cycle: the recession of 1982. Here we get basically the same results as with
the earlier period: the efficiency and labor wedges play primary roles in
the business cycle fluctuations, and the investment wedge plays essentially
none.
We start here, as we did in the Great Depression analysis, by displaying ac-
tual U.S. output over the entire business cycle period (here, 1979–1985) along
with the three measured wedges for that period. In Figure 5, we see that out-
put falls nearly 10% relative to trend between 1979 and 1982, and by 1985 is
back up to about 1% below trend. We also see that the efficiency wedge falls
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FIGURE 5.—U.S. output and three measured wedges (quarterly, 1979:1–1985:4; normalized to
equal 100 in 1979:1).
between 1979 and 1982, and by 1985 is still a little more than 3% below trend.
The labor wedge also worsens from 1979 to 1982, but it improves substantially
by 1985. The investment wedge, meanwhile, fluctuates until 1983 and improves
thereafter.
An analysis of the effects of the wedges separately for the 1979–1985 period
is shown in Figures 6 and 7. In Figure 6, we see that the model with the ef-
ficiency wedge alone produces a decline in output from 1979 to 1982 of 6%,
which is about 60% of the actual decline in that period. Here output recovers a
bit more slowly than in the data, but seems to otherwise generally parallel the
data’s movements. The model with the labor wedge alone produces a decline
in output from 1979 to 1982 of only about 3%. In Figure 7, we see that the
model with just the investment wedge produces essentially no fluctuations in
output.
Now we examine how well a combination of wedges reproduces the data for
the 1982 recession period just as we did for the Depression period. In Fig-
ure 8, we plot the movements in output, labor, and investment during 1979–
1985 due to two combinations of wedges. One is the combined effects of the
efficiency, labor, and (insignificant) government consumption components (la-
beled Model With No Investment Wedge). In terms of output, this combina-
tion mimics the decline in output until 1982 extremely well and produces a
slightly shallower recovery than in the data. The other is the combination of
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FIGURE 6.—Data and predictions of the models with just one wedge.
the labor, investment, and government components (labeled Model With No
Efficiency Wedge), which produces a modest decline in output relative to the
data. In Figures 6, 7, and 8, we see clearly that in the model with no efficiency
wedge, the labor wedge accounts for essentially all of the decline and the in-
vestment wedge accounts for essentially none.
3.3. Extending the Analysis to the Entire Postwar Period
So far we have analyzed the wedges and their contributions for specific
episodes. The findings for both episodes suggest that frictions in detailed mod-
els, which manifest themselves as investment wedges in the benchmark pro-
totype economy, play, at best, a tertiary role in accounting for business cycle
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FIGURE 7.—Data and predictions of the model with just the investment wedge.
fluctuations. Do our findings apply beyond those particular episodes? We at-
tempt to extend our analysis to the entire postwar period by developing some
summary statistics for the period from 1959:1 through 2004:3 using HP-filtered
data. We first consider the standard deviations of the wedges relative to out-
put as well as correlations of the wedges with each other and with output at
various leads and lags. We then consider the standard deviations and the cross
correlations of output due to each wedge. These statistics summarize salient
features of the wedges and their role in output fluctuations for the entire post-
war sample. We think of the wedge statistics as analogs of our plots of the
wedges and the output statistics as analogs of our plots of output due to just
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FIGURE 8.—Data and predictions of the models with all wedges but one.
one wedge.2 The results suggest that our earlier findings do hold up, at least
in a relative sense: the investment wedge seems to play a larger role over the
entire postwar period than in the 1982 recession, but its effects are still quite
modest compared to those of the other wedges.
In Tables II and III, we display standard deviations and cross correlations cal-
culated using HP-filtered data for the postwar period. Panel A of Table II shows
that the efficiency, labor, and investment wedges are positively correlated with
2In Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004), we applied a spectral method to determine the con-
tributions of the wedges based on the population properties of the stochastic process generated
by the model. We did this for both periods and found that the investment wedge plays only a
modest role in both.
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TABLE II
PROPERTIES OF THE WEDGES, 1959:1–2004:3a
A. Summary Statistics
Standard Deviation
Relative to Output
Cross Correlation of Wedge with Output at Lag k=
Wedges −2 −1 0 1 2
Efficiency 63 65 76 85 60 35
Labor 92 52 65 71 73 68
Investment 118 44 48 47 30 09
Government
consumption 151 −42 −42 −33 −24 −11
B. Cross Correlations
Cross Correlation of X with Y at Lag k=
Wedges (XY) −2 −1 0 1 2
Efficiency, labor 57 48 30 28 16
Efficiency, investment 31 46 61 47 35
Efficiency, government
consumption −27 −33 −34 −35 −31
Labor, investment −07 11 18 37 46
Labor, government
consumption −02 −22 −38 −47 −50
Investment, government
consumption −60 −73 −88 −70 −51
aSeries are first logged and detrended using the HP filter.
output, both contemporaneously and for several leads and lags. In contrast,
the government consumption wedge is somewhat negatively correlated with
output, both contemporaneously and for several leads and lags. (Note that
the government consumption wedge is the sum of government consumption
and net exports, and that net exports are negatively correlated with output.)
Panel B of Table II shows that the cross correlations of the efficiency, labor,
and investment wedges are generally positive.
Table III summarizes various statistics of the movements of output over this
period due to each wedge. Consider panel A and focus first on the output fluc-
tuations due to the efficiency wedge. Table III shows that output movements
due to this wedge have a standard deviation that is 73% of that of output in
the data. These movements are highly positively correlated with output in the
data, both contemporaneously and for several leads and lags. These statistics
are consistent with our episodic analysis of the 1982 recession, which showed
that the efficiency wedge can account for about 60% of the actual decline in
output during that period and comoves highly with it.
Consider next the role of the other wedges in the entire postwar period. Re-
turn to Table III. In panel A, again, we see that output due to the labor wedge
alone fluctuates almost 60% as much as does output in the data and is posi-
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TABLE III
PROPERTIES OF THE OUTPUT COMPONENTS, 1959:1–2004:3a
A. Summary Statistics
Standard Deviation
Relative to Output
Cross Correlation of Wedge with Output at Lag k=
Output Components −2 −1 0 1 2
Efficiency 73 65 75 83 57 31
Labor 59 44 59 68 74 74
Investment 31 33 37 40 25 07
Government consumption 40 −45 −45 −39 −25 −08
B. Cross Correlations
Cross Correlation of X with Y at Lag k=
Output Components (XY) −2 −1 0 1 2
Efficiency, labor 54 41 18 15 04
Efficiency, investment 30 44 60 40 28
Efficiency, government
consumption −34 −45 −56 −48 −39
Labor, investment −17 −03 −03 20 29
Labor, government
consumption 14 −03 −13 −31 −40
Investment, government
consumption −49 −63 −87 −66 −48
aSeries are first logged and detrended using the HP filter.
tively correlated with it. Output due to the investment wedge alone fluctuates
less than one-third as much as output in the data and is somewhat positively
correlated with it. Finally, output due to the government consumption wedge
alone fluctuates about 40% as much as output in the data and is somewhat
negatively correlated with it. In panel B of Table III, we see that output move-
ments due to the efficiency and labor wedges as well as the efficiency and in-
vestment wedges are positively correlated, and that the cross correlations of
output movements due to the other wedges are mostly essentially zero or neg-
ative.
All of our analyses using business cycle accounting thus seem to lead to the
same conclusion: to study business cycles, the most promising detailed models
to explore are those in which frictions manifest themselves primarily as effi-
ciency or labor wedges, not as investment wedges.
4. INTERPRETING WEDGES WITH ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGY OR
PREFERENCE SPECIFICATIONS
In detailed economies with technology and preferences similar to those
in our benchmark prototype economy, the equivalence propositions proved
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thus far provide a mapping between frictions in those detailed economies and
wedges in the prototype economy. Here we construct a similar mapping when
technology or preferences differ in the two types of economies. We then ask if
this alternative mapping changes our substantive conclusion that financial fric-
tions, which manifest themselves primarily as investment wedges, are unlikely
to play a primary role in accounting for business cycles. We find that it does
not.
When detailed economies have technology or preferences different from the
benchmark economy’s, wedges in the benchmark economy can be viewed as
arising from two sources: frictions in the detailed economy and differences
in the specification of technology or preferences. Although researchers could
simply use results from our benchmark prototype economy to draw inferences
about promising classes of models, drawing such inferences is easier with an al-
ternative approach. Basically, we decompose the wedges into their two sources.
To do that, construct an alternative prototype economy with technology and
preferences that do coincide with those in the detailed economy, and repeat
the business cycle accounting procedure with those two economies. The part
of the wedges in the benchmark prototype economy due to frictions, then, will
be the wedges in the alternative prototype economy, while the remainder will
be due to specification differences.
Here we use this approach to explore alternative prototype economies with
technology and preference specifications chosen because of their popularity in
the literature. These alternative specifications include variable instead of fixed
capital utilization, different labor supply elasticities, and varying levels of costs
to adjusting investment.
Two of these changes offer no help to investment wedges. Adding variable
capital utilization to the analysis shifts the relative contributions of the effi-
ciency and labor wedges to output’s fluctuations—decreasing the efficiency
wedge’s contribution and increasing the labor wedge’s—but this alternative
specification leaves the investment wedge’s contribution definitely in third
place. Adding different labor elasticities to the analysis offers no help either.
The third specification change seems to give investment wedges a slightly
larger role, but still not a primary one. With investment adjustment costs added
to the analysis, the investment wedge in the benchmark prototype economy
depends on both the investment wedge and the marginal cost of investment
in the alternative prototype economy. We find that even if the investment
wedge is constant in the benchmark economy, it will worsen during recessions
and improve during booms in the alternative economy. With our measured
wedges, this finding suggests that with large enough adjustment costs, invest-
ment wedges in detailed economies could play a significant role in business
cycle fluctuations.
To study this possibility, we investigate the effects of two parameter values
for adjustment costs: one at the level used by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999), the BGG level, and one we consider extreme, at four times that level. For
BUSINESS CYCLE ACCOUNTING 813
the Great Depression period, we find that for both adjustment cost levels, in-
vestment wedges play only a minor role. For the 1982 recession period, we find
that these wedges play a very small role with BGG level costs and a somewhat
larger but still modest role with the much higher costs. These findings suggest
that researchers who think adjustment costs are extremely high may want to
include in their models financial frictions that manifest themselves as invest-
ment wedges. Such models are not likely to do well, however, unless they also
include other frictions that play the primary role in business cycle fluctuations.
4.1. Details of Alternative Specifications
A. Variable capital utilization
We begin with an extreme view about the amount of variability in capital
utilization.
Our specification of the technology, which allows for variable capital uti-
lization, follows the work of Kydland and Prescott (1988) and Hornstein and
Prescott (1993). We assume that the production function is now
y =A(kh)α(nh)1−α(28)
where n is the number of workers employed and h is the length (or hours) of
the workweek. The labor input is, then, l = nh.
In the data, we measure only the labor input l and the capital stock k. We
do not directly measure h or n. The benchmark specification for the produc-
tion function can be interpreted as assuming that all of the observed variation
in measured labor input l is in the number of workers and that the work-
week h is constant. Under this interpretation, our benchmark specification
with fixed capital utilization correctly measures the efficiency wedge (up to the
constant h).
Now we investigate the opposite extreme: Assume that the number of work-
ers n is constant and that all the variation in labor is from the workweek h.
Under this variable capital utilization specification, the services of capital kh
are proportional to the product of the stock k and the labor input l, so that
variations in the labor input induce variations in the flow of capital services.
Thus, the capital utilization rate is proportional to the labor input l, and the
efficiency wedge is proportional to y/kα.
Consider an alternative prototype economy, denoted economy 2, that is iden-
tical to a deterministic version of our benchmark prototype economy, denoted
economy 1, except that the production function is now given by y =Akαl. Let
the sequence of wedges and the equilibrium outcomes in the two economies
be (Ait τlit τxit) and (yit cit lit xit) for i= 12. We then have the next propo-
sition:
PROPOSITION 3: If the sequence of wedges for an alternative prototype econ-
omy 2 are related to the wedges in the prototype economy 1 by A2t = A1t l−α1t ,
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1 − τl2t = (1 − α)(1 − τl1t), and τx2t = τx1t , then the equilibrium outcomes for
the two economies coincide.
PROOF: We prove this proposition by showing that the equilibrium condi-
tions of economy 2 are satisfied at the equilibrium outcomes of economy 1. Be-
cause y1t = A1tkα1t l1−α1t , using the definition of A2t , we have that y1t = A2tkα1t l1t .
The first-order condition for labor in economy 1 is
−Ult(c1t  l1t)
Uct(c1t  l1t)
= (1 − τl1t) (1 − α)y1t
l1t

Using the definition of τl2t , we have that
−Ult(c1t  l1t)
Uct(c1t  l1t)
= (1 − τl2t)y1t
l1t

The rest of the equations that govern the equilibrium are unaffected. Q.E.D.
Note that even if the efficiency wedge in the alternative prototype economy
does not fluctuate, the associated efficiency wedge in the prototype economy
will. Proposition 3 also implies that if τx1t is a constant, so that the contribution
of the investment wedge to fluctuations in economy 1 is zero, then τx2t is also
a constant; hence, the contribution of the investment wedge to fluctuations in
economy 2 is also zero. Extending this proposition to a stochastic environment
is immediate.
Now suppose that we are interested in detailed economies with variable cap-
ital utilization. We use the alternative prototype economy to ask whether this
change affects our substantive conclusions. In answering this question, we rees-
timate the parameters of the stochastic process for the underlying state. (For
details, see the technical appendix.)
Variable capital utilization can induce significant changes in the measured
efficiency wedge. To see these changes, in Figure 9, we plot the measured ef-
ficiency wedges for these two specifications of capital utilization during the
Great Depression period (with it fixed in the benchmark economy and variable
now). Clearly, when capital utilization is variable rather than fixed, the effi-
ciency wedge falls less and recovers more by 1939. (For the other wedges, see
the technical appendix.)
In Figure 10, we plot the data and the predicted output due to the efficiency
and labor wedges for the 1930s when the model includes variable capital uti-
lization. Comparing Figures 10 and 2, we see that with the remeasured effi-
ciency wedge, the labor wedge plays a much larger role in accounting for the
output downturn and slow recovery, and the efficiency wedge plays a much
smaller role.
In Figure 11, we plot the three data series again, this time with the predic-
tions of the variable capital utilization model with just the investment wedge.
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FIGURE 9.—Varying the capital utilization specification during the Great Depression period.
Measured efficiency wedges for two capital utilization specifications.
Comparing this to Figure 3, we see that with variable capital utilization, the
investment wedge drives output the wrong way to an even greater extent than
in the benchmark economy.
In Figure 12, we compare the contributions of the sum of the efficiency and
labor wedges for the two specifications of capital utilization (fixed and vari-
able) during the Great Depression period. The figure shows that these contri-
butions are quite similar. Although remeasuring the efficiency wedge changes
the relative contributions of the two wedges, it clearly has little effect on their
combined contribution.
Overall, then, taking account of variable capital utilization strengthens our
finding that in the Great Depression period, the efficiency and labor wedges
play a primary role and investment wedges do not.
B. Different labor supply elasticities
Now we consider the effects on our results of changing the elasticity of labor
supply. We assume in our benchmark model that preferences are logarithmic
in both consumption and leisure. Consider now an alternative prototype econ-
omy with a different elasticity of labor supply. We show that a result analogous
to that in Proposition 3 holds: allowing for different labor supply elasticities
changes the size of the measured labor wedge but not that of the measured
investment wedge. Therefore, if the contribution of the investment wedge is
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FIGURE 10.—Data and predictions of the models with variable capital utilization and just one
wedge.
zero in the benchmark prototype economy, it is also zero in an economy with
a different labor supply elasticity.
To see that, consider an alternative prototype economy that is identical to a
deterministic version of our benchmark model except that now the utility func-
tion is given by U(c)+ V2(1 − l). Denote the utility function in our benchmark
prototype economy (economy 1) by U(c) + V1(1 − l). Clearly, by varying the
function V2, we can generate a wide range of alternative labor supply elastici-
ties.
Let the sequence of wedges and the equilibrium outcomes in the two
economies be (Ait τlit τxit) and (yit cit lit xit) for i = 12. We then have the
next proposition:
BUSINESS CYCLE ACCOUNTING 817
FIGURE 11.—Data and predictions of the model with variable capital utilization and just the
investment wedge.
PROPOSITION 4: If the sequence of wedges for the alternative prototype econ-
omy, economy 2, is given by
1 − τl2t = (1 − τl1t)V
′
2 (1 − l1t)
V ′1 (1 − l1t)

and if A2t = A1t and τx2t = τx1t , then the equilibrium outcomes for the two
economies coincide.
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FIGURE 12.—Predictions of the models with fixed and variable capital utilization and with all
but the investment wedge.
PROOF: We prove this proposition by showing that the equilibrium condi-
tions of economy 2 are satisfied at the equilibrium outcomes of economy 1.
The first-order condition for labor input in economy 1 is
−V
′
1 (1 − l1t)
U ′(c1t)
= (1 − τl1t) (1 − α)y1t
l1t

Using the definition of τl2t , we have that
−V
′
2 (1 − l1t)
U ′(c1t)
= (1 − τl2t) (1 − α)y1t
l1t

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so that the first-order condition for labor in economy 2 is satisfied. The rest of
the equations that govern the equilibrium are unaffected. Q.E.D.
Note that here even if the labor wedge does not fluctuate in our bench-
mark prototype economy, it typically will in the alternative prototype economy.
Note also that the investment wedges are the same in both economies. Thus,
if the investment wedge is constant in one economy, it is constant in the other,
and the contribution of the investment wedge to fluctuations is zero in both
economies. Extending this proposition to a stochastic environment is immedi-
ate.
C. Investment adjustment costs
Now we consider a third alternative prototype economy, this one with in-
vestment adjustment costs. These costs can be interpreted as standing in for
one of two features of detailed economies. One is that the detailed economies
have adjustment costs in converting output into installed capital. Another in-
terpretation is that the detailed model does not have adjustment costs, but
that financial frictions manifest themselves as adjustment costs in the alterna-
tive prototype economy (as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997)).
In this alternative prototype economy, the only difference from the bench-
mark prototype economy is that the capital accumulation law is no longer (1),
but rather is
(1 + γn)kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + xt −φ
(
xt
kt
)
kt(29)
where φ represents the per unit cost of adjusting the capital stock. In the
macroeconomic literature, a commonly used functional form for the adjust-
ment costs φ is
φ
(
x
k
)
= a
2
(
x
k
− b
)2
(30)
where b= δ+ γ + γn is the steady-state value of the investment–capital ratio.
To set up the analog of Propositions 3 and 4, let the wedges in the bench-
mark prototype economy, economy 1, and the alternative prototype economy,
economy 2, be (Ait τlit τxit) and (yit cit lit xit) for i = 12. For simplicity, let
τx2t and g2t be identically zero. The proof of the following proposition is imme-
diate.
PROPOSITION 5: If the sequence of wedges for the alternative prototype econ-
omy, economy 2, is given by A2t =A1t , τl2t = τl1t , τx1t implicitly defined by
A1t+1Fkt+1 + (1 − δ)(1 + τx1t+1)
1 + τx1t(31)
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= A2t+1Fkt+1 + (1 − δ+φt − x2t+1φ
′
t+1/k2t+1)(1 −φ′t+1)−1
(1 −φ′t)−1

and g1t =φtk2t , then the equilibrium outcomes for the two economies coincide.
To understand the investment wedge τx1t , note that if adjustment costs are
given by (30), then the term φt −xt+1φ′t+1/kt+1 in (31) equals a[(x/k)2 −b2]/2,
which is an order of magnitude smaller than φ′t = a[x/k−b]. Setting this term
to zero gives the approximation
1 + τx1t = 11 −φ′t
(32)
From (32) and the convexity of φ, we see that τx1 is increasing in x/k and is
zero when x/k is at its steady-state value. Hence, in recessions, when x/k is
relatively low, τx1 is negative; in booms, when x/k is relatively high, τx1 is posi-
tive. In this sense, even when the alternative prototype economy has no invest-
ment wedges, τx1 will be countercyclical in the benchmark prototype economy,
so investment distortions will be smaller in recessions.
Note, more generally, that when investment wedges in the alternative proto-
type economy are nonzero, the analog of (32) is
1 + τx1t = 1 + τx2t1 −φ′t
(33)
We can also use the equivalence map in (33) in the reverse direction. Imagine
that the data are generated from a detailed economy with no adjustment costs
and no frictions. The benchmark prototype economy will have τx1t = 0. Sup-
pose a researcher considers an alternative prototype economy with adjustment
costs. This researcher will find that 1 + τx2t = 1 − φ′t , so that the investment
wedge will be procyclical even though the detailed economy has no frictions.
More generally, a researcher who incorrectly specifies too high a level of
adjustment costs in the alternative prototype economy will infer that invest-
ment wedges play a much larger role than they actually do. To get some in-
tuition for this result, consider two alternative prototype economies A and B,
both of which have investment wedges and adjustment costs. The analog of
our approximation (33) is (1 + τxAt)/(1 − φ′At) = (1 + τxBt)/(1 −φ′Bt), where
φit denotes adjustment costs in economy i=AB. Straightforward algebra es-
tablishes that specifying too high a level of adjustment costs makes investment
wedges seem worse in recessions than they actually are.
Now we consider a prototype economy with adjustment costs and ask
whether frictions that manifest themselves as investment wedges in such a pro-
totype economy play an important role. We find that they do not, either when
they are set at the level chosen by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
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FIGURE 13.—Measured investment wedges for two adjustment cost specifications (normalized
to equal 100 in 1929 or 1979:1).
or at four times that level. We begin by following Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999) in how we choose the value for the parameter a. Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (BGG) chose this parameter so that the elasticity, η, of
the price of capital with respect to the investment–capital ratio is 25. In this
setup, the price of capital q= 1/(1 −φ′), so that, evaluated at the steady state,
η= a(δ+γ+γn). Given our other parameters, a= 322. In Figures 13 and 14,
this parameterization is the model labeled BGG Costs. Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist also argued that a reasonable range for the elasticity η is between 0
and .5, and that values much outside this range imply implausibly high adjust-
ment costs. We consider an extreme case in which η = 1, so that a = 1288,
roughly four times the BGG level. In the figures, this parameterization is the
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FIGURE 14.—U.S. output and predictions of model with alternative adjustment costs and just
the investment wedge (normalized to equal 100 in 1929 or 1979:1).
model labeled Extreme Costs. For each setting of the parameter a, we rees-
timate the stochastic process for the state. (For the parameter values of the
stochastic process, see the technical appendix.)
Comparing the investment wedges in Figure 1 and panel A of Figure 13, we
see that introducing investment adjustment costs leads the investment wedge
to worsen rather than improve in the early part of the Great Depression. In
panel A of Figure 14 we see that this worsening produces a decline in output
from 1929 to 1933. With the BGG adjustment costs, however, the decline is tiny
(2% from 1929 to 1933). Even with the extreme adjustment costs, the decline is
only 6.5% and, hence, accounts for only about one-sixth of the overall decline
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in output.3 Moreover, with these extreme adjustment costs, the consumption
anomaly associated with investment wedges is acute. For example, from 1929
to 1932, relative to trend, consumption in the data falls about 18%, while in
the model it actually rises by more than 5%.
We are skeptical that detailed models with extreme adjustment costs are
worth exploring. With extreme costs, given the observed levels of investment
and the capital stock in the data, (30) implies that the resources lost due to
adjustment costs as a fraction of output are nearly 7% in 1933. We share
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist’s (1999) concerns that costs of this magni-
tude are implausibly large. From 1929 to 1933, investment falls sharply, but the
adjustment costs implied by (30) rise sharply. Why would firms incur adjust-
ment costs simply by investing at positive rates below their steady-state value?
The idea that managers incurred huge adjustment costs simply because they
were watching their machines depreciate seems farfetched. Furthermore, the
idea that from 1929 to 1933 investment fell sharply but adjustment costs rose
sharply is inconsistent with interpreting these costs as arising from monitoring
costs in an economy with financial frictions. Indeed, in such an economy, as
investment activity falls, so do monitoring costs.
We performed similar experiments for the 1982 recession period with similar
results. In panel B of Figure 13, we see that with BGG costs, the investment
wedge fluctuates little through the end of 1982 and improves thereafter. With
extreme costs, the investment wedge worsens until 1983 and improves there-
after. Panel B of Figure 14 shows that in the model with costs at the BGG
level, the investment wedge plays essentially no role in output fluctuations.
With costs at four times the BGG level, the panel shows that the investment
wedge plays a bit larger but still modest role. Recall that, relative to trend,
output in the data falls almost 10% from its peak to its trough. With extreme
adjustment costs, output due to the investment wedge falls about 2.2%, so that
the investment wedge appears to account for roughly one-fifth of the fall in
output.
In our judgment, the investment wedge actually accounts for much less than
one-fifth of the 1982 recession fall in output because we think extreme adjust-
ment costs are implausible. Even aside from the Great Depression issues, we
find models with extreme adjustment costs difficult to reconcile with data on
plant level investment decisions. An extensive literature has documented that
investment at the plant level has large spikes. Doms and Dunne (1994), for ex-
ample, examined plant level data for 33,000 plants over 17 years. They showed
that much of the growth in the capital stock of a plant is concentrated in a short
period of time. In the year of highest investment, the capital stock grows 45%,
3In general, in our Great Depression experiments, linear methods perform poorly compared
to our nonlinear method. With extreme adjustment costs, for example, linear methods produce
large errors, on the order of 100%.
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while in the years immediately before and after that, it grows less than 10%.
Such behavior is clearly inconsistent with extreme adjustment costs.
Furthermore, the use of adjustment costs in macroeconomic analysis is con-
troversial. Kydland and Prescott (1982), for example, have argued that mod-
els with adjustment costs like those in equation (30) are inconsistent with
the data. Such models imply a static relationship between the investment–
capital ratio and the relative price of investment goods to output (of the form
q = 1/[1 −φ′(x/k)]). This means that the elasticity of the investment–capital
ratio with respect to the relative price is the same in the short run and the
long run. Kydland and Prescott argued that this is not consistent with the data,
where short-run elasticities are much smaller than long-run elasticities.
Finally, the finding that investment wedges play a modest role when adjust-
ment costs are extreme is easy to reconcile with the view that financial frictions,
which manifest themselves primarily as investment wedges, play a small role
over the business cycle. This reconciliation uses the insight discussed above
that a modeler who incorrectly specifies too high a level of adjustment costs
will incorrectly find too large a role for investment wedges.
5. CONTRASTING OUR DECOMPOSITION WITH
TRADITIONAL DECOMPOSITIONS
Our decomposition of business cycle fluctuations is intended to isolate the
partial effects of each of the wedges on equilibrium outcomes, and in this sense,
it is different from traditional decompositions. Those decompositions attempt
to isolate the effects of (so-called) primitive shocks on equilibrium outcomes;
ours does not. Isolating the effects of primitive shocks requires specifying a
detailed model. Because our procedure precedes the specification of a detailed
model, it obviously cannot be used to isolate the effects of primitive shocks. To
clarify the distinction between our decomposition and a traditional one, here
we describe a traditional decomposition and explain why we prefer ours.
The traditional decomposition attempts to isolate the effects of primitive
shocks by “naming the innovations.” Recall that in our stochastic process for
the four wedges, (27), the innovations εt+1 are allowed to be contemporane-
ously correlated with the covariance matrix V . Under the traditional decom-
position, the primitive shocks, say, ηt+1, are assumed to be mean zero, to be
contemporaneously uncorrelated with Eηt+1η′t+1 = I, and to lead to the same
stochastic process for the wedges. Identifying these primitive shocks requires
specifying a matrix R so that Rηt+1 = εt+1 and RR′ = V . Names are then made
up for these shocks, including money shocks, demand shocks, technology shocks,
and so on.
In the traditional method, then, given any sequence of realized wedges st
and the specification of the matrix R, the associated realized values of ηt =
(η1t η2t η3t η4t)
′ are computed. The movements in, say, output, are then de-
composed into the movements due to each one of these primitive shocks as fol-
lows. Let st(η1)= (logAt(η1) τlt(η1) τxt(η1) loggt(η1)) denote the realized
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values of the four wedges when the primitive shock sequence ηt = (η1t 000)
is fed into
st+1 = P0 + Pst +Rηt+1
(Note that when the covariance matrix V is not diagonal, movements in a prim-
itive shock η1t will lead to movements in more than one wedge.) The predicted
value of, say, output due to η1 is then computed from the decision rules of
the model according to yt(η1) = y(kt(η1) st(η1)), where kt(η1) is computed
recursively using the decision rule for investment, the initial capital stock, and
the capital accumulation law. The values st(η2), yt(η2), and so forth are com-
puted in a similar way.
Notice that in this traditional decomposition method, the realized value of
each wedge is simply the sum of the parts due to η1η2, and so on, in that
logAt =
∑
i
logAt(ηi) τlt =
∑
i
τlt(ηi)
τxt =
∑
i
τxt(ηi) loggt =
∑
i
loggt(ηi)
In this sense, the traditional decomposition attempts to decompose each of
the four wedges into four component parts, each of which is due to a primitive
shock.
Our decomposition is purposefully less ambitious. It includes only the effect
of the movements of each total wedge, not any of its subparts. The advan-
tage of our decomposition is that it is invariant to R, so that we do not need
to make identifying assumptions implicit in the specification of the matrix R,
nor do we need to make up names for the shocks. The invariance makes our
method valuable. The problem with the traditional approach is that finding
identifying assumptions that apply to a broad class of detailed models is very
difficult. Hence, this approach is not useful to point researchers toward classes
of promising models. In a sense, the traditional approach puts the cart before
the horse: the decomposition requires specifying the matrix R, but doing that
requires a detailed model. Our decomposition is useful precisely because it
does not need to make up identifying assumptions to specify the matrix R. Our
equivalence results have identifying assumptions built into them, so that results
from the benchmark prototype economy can be used to uncover promising
classes of detailed models.
6. REVIEWING THE RELATED LITERATURE
Our work here is related to the existing literature in terms of methodology
and the interpretation of the wedges.
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6.1. Methodology
Our basic method is to use restrictions from economic theory to back out
wedges from the data, formulate stochastic processes for these wedges, and
then put the wedges back into a quantitative general equilibrium model for an
accounting exercise. This basic idea is at the heart of an enormous amount of
work in the real business cycle theory literature. Prescott (1986), for example,
asked what fraction of the variance of output can plausibly be attributed to pro-
ductivity shocks, which we have referred to as the efficiency wedge. Subsequent
studies have expanded this general equilibrium accounting exercise to include
a wide variety of other shocks. (See, for example, the studies in Cooley’s (1995)
volume.)
An important difference between our method and others is that we back
out the labor wedge and the investment wedge from the combined consumer
and firm first-order conditions, while most of the recent business cycle liter-
ature uses direct measures of labor and investment shocks. Perhaps the most
closely related precursor of our method is McGrattan’s (1991); she used the
equilibrium of her model to infer the implicit wedges. Ingram, Kocherlakota,
and Savin (1997) advocated a similar approach.
6.2. Wedge Interpretations
The idea that taxes of various kinds distort the relationship between various
marginal conditions is the cornerstone of public finance. Taxes are not the only
well-known distortions; monopoly power by unions or firms is also commonly
thought to produce a labor wedge. Additionally, the idea that a labor wedge
is produced by sticky wages or sticky prices is the cornerstone of the new Key-
nesian approach to business cycles; see, for example, the survey by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999). One contribution of our work here is to show the precise
mapping between the wedges and general equilibrium models with frictions.
Many studies have plotted one or more of the four wedges. The efficiency
wedge has been extensively studied. (See, for example, Kehoe and Prescott
(2002).) The labor wedge has also been studied. For example, Parkin (1988),
Hall (1997), and Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2007) all graphed and inter-
preted the labor wedge for the postwar data. Parkin discussed how monetary
shocks might drive this wedge, and Hall discussed how search frictions might
drive it. Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido discussed a variety of interpretations
of the labor wedge, as did Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1999). Mulligan
(2002a, 2002b) plotted the labor wedge for the United States for much of the
20th century, including the Great Depression period. He interpreted move-
ments in this wedge as arising from changes in labor market institutions and
regulation, including features we discuss here. Cole and Ohanian (2002) plot-
ted the labor wedge for the Great Depression and offered interpretations simi-
lar to ours. The investment wedge has been investigated by McGrattan (1991),
Braun (1994), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and Cooper and Ejarque (2000).
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This study is aimed at applied theorists who are interested in building de-
tailed, quantitative models of economic fluctuations. Once such theorists have
chosen the primitive sources of shocks to economic activity, they need to
choose the mechanisms through which the shocks lead to business cycle fluctu-
ations. We have shown that these mechanisms can be summarized by their ef-
fects on four wedges in the standard growth model. Our business cycle account-
ing method can be used to judge which mechanisms are promising and which
are not, thus helping theorists narrow their options. We view our method as an
alternative to the use of structural vector autoregressions (VARs), which has
also been advocated as a way to identify promising mechanisms. (Elsewhere,
in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005), we argued that structural VARs have
deficiencies that limit their usefulness.)
Here we have demonstrated how our method works by applying it to two his-
torical episodes—the Great Depression and the 1982 U.S. recession. We have
found that efficiency and labor wedges, in combination, account for essentially
all of the decline and recovery in these business cycles; investment wedges play,
at best, a tertiary role. These results hold in summary statistics of the entire
postwar period and in alternative specifications of the growth model. We have
also found that when we maximize the contribution of the investment wedge,
the models display a consumption anomaly: they tend to produce much smaller
declines in consumption during downturns than occur in the data. These find-
ings together imply that existing models of financial frictions in which the dis-
tortions primarily manifest themselves as investment wedges can account, at
best, for only a small fraction of the fluctuations in the Great Depression or
more typical U.S. downturns. This finding is our primary substantive contribu-
tion.
We have seen that if adjustment costs are extreme, investment wedges can
play a larger but still modest role over the business cycle. A combination of mi-
croeconomic and macroeconomic observations argue against extreme adjust-
ment costs, and we view them as a theoretical curiosity of no applied interest.
A useful extension of our work here would be to decompose our wedges into
a portion that comes from explicit taxes imposed by governments and a portion
that comes from frictions in detailed models. This decomposition would be
particularly useful when explicit taxes vary significantly over the business cycle.
Researchers have argued—quite beyond the prominent model of Bernanke
and Gertler (1989)—that frictions in financial markets are important for busi-
ness cycle fluctuations. (See Bernanke (1983) and the motivation in Bernanke
and Gertler (1989).) We stress that our findings do not contradict this idea.
Indeed, we have shown that a detailed economy with input-financing frictions
is equivalent to a prototype economy with efficiency wedges. In this sense, al-
though existing models of financial frictions are not promising, new models in
which financial frictions show up as efficiency and labor wedges are.
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Our results suggest that future theoretical work should focus on developing
models that lead to fluctuations in efficiency and labor wedges. Many exist-
ing models produce fluctuations in labor wedges. The challenging task is to
develop detailed models in which primitive shocks lead to fluctuations in effi-
ciency wedges as well.
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APPENDIX: THE MAPPING FOR TWO OTHER WEDGES
Here we demonstrate the mapping from two other detailed economies with
frictions to two prototype economies with wedges. In the preceding text, we
described the mapping for efficiency and labor wedges. In this appendix, we
describe it for investment and government consumption wedges.
A1. Investment Wedges Due to Financial Frictions
We start with the mapping of financial frictions to investment wedges.
In Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004), we showed the equivalence be-
tween the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) model and a prototype economy.
Here we focus on the financial frictions in the Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999) model and abstract from the monetary features of that model.
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist began by deriving the optimal financial con-
tracts between risk-neutral entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries in an
environment with no aggregate uncertainty. These contracts resemble debt
contracts (with default). Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist tried to extend their
derivation of optimal contracts to an economy with aggregate uncertainty.
The contracts they considered are not optimal given the environment, because
these contracts do not allow risk sharing between risk-averse consumers and
risk-neutral entrepreneurs. Here we solve for optimal debt-like contracts that
arbitrarily rule out such risk sharing, but even so, our first-order conditions
differ from those of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist. (One reason for this dif-
ference is that our break-even constraint for the financial intermediary and our
law of motion for entrepreneurial net worth differ from theirs. See equations
(35) and (37) below.)
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A1.1. A detailed economy with financial frictions
The Bernanke–Gertler–Gilchrist model has a continuum of risk-neutral en-
trepreneurs of mass Le, a continuum of consumers of mass 1, and a represen-
tative firm. Output y(st) is produced according to
y(st)=A(st)kα[lΩL1−Ωe ]1−α(34)
where A(st), k, and l denote the technology shock, the capital stock, and
the labor supplied by consumers. The stochastic process for the technol-
ogy shock is given by logA(st+1) = (1 − ρA) logA + ρA logA(st) + εA(st+1).
Each entrepreneur supplies one unit of labor inelastically. The representa-
tive firm’s maximization problem is to choose lLe, and k to maximize profits
A(st)kα[lΩL1−Ωe ]1−α −w(st)l−we(st)Le − r(st)k, where w(st), we(st), and r(st)
denote the wage rate for consumers, the wage rate for entrepreneurs, and the
rental rate on capital.
New capital goods can be produced only by entrepreneurs. Each entrepre-
neur owns a technology that transforms output and old capital at the end of
any period into capital goods at the beginning of the following period. In each
period t, each entrepreneur receives an idiosyncratic shock ω drawn from a
distribution F(ω) with expected value 1. This shock is independent and identi-
cally distributed across entrepreneurs and time. The realization of ω is private
information to the entrepreneur. An entrepreneur who buys k(st−1) units of
goods in period t − 1 produces ωk(st−1) units of capital at the beginning of
period t. These capital goods are sold at price Rk(st)= r(st)+ (1 − δ), where
δ is the rate of depreciation of the capital goods.
Entrepreneurs finance the production of new capital goods partly with
their own net worth, n(st−1), and partly with loans from financial interme-
diaries. These intermediaries offer contracts with the following cutoff form:
in all idiosyncratic states at t in which ω ≥ ω¯(st), the entrepreneur pays
ω¯(st)Rk(s
t)k(st−1) and keeps [ω − ω¯(st)]Rk(st)k(st−1). In all other states,
the entrepreneur receives nothing, while the financial intermediary receives
ωRk(s
t)k(st−1) net of monitoring costs µωRk(st)k(st−1). We assume that fi-
nancial intermediaries make zero profit in equilibrium.
Given an entrepreneur’s net worth n(st−1), the contracting problem for a
representative entrepreneur is to choose the cutoff ω¯(st) for each state and
the amount of goods invested k(st−1) to maximize the expected utility of the
entrepreneurs,
∑
π(st |st−1){[1 − Γ (ω¯(st))]Rk(st)k(st−1)dF(ω)}
subject to a break-even constraint for the intermediary,
∑
(st |st−1)[Γ (ω¯(st))−µG(ω¯(st))]Rk(st)k(st−1)= k(st−1)−n(st−1)(35)
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where Γ (ω¯)= ∫ ω¯0 ωf(ω)dω+ ω¯∫ ∞ω¯ f (ω)dω and G(ω¯)= ∫ ω¯0 ωf(ω)dω. Here
q(st |st−1) denotes the price of consumption goods in state st in units of con-
sumption goods in state st−1.
This formulation implies an aggregation result: The capital demand of the
entrepreneurs is linear in their net worth, so that total demand for goods from
them depends only on their total net worth. The solution to the contracting
problem is characterized by the first-order conditions with respect to k(st−1)
and ω¯(st), which can be summarized by
∑
π(st |st−1)[1 − Γ (ω¯(st))]Rk(st)∑
π(st |st−1)Γ ′(ω¯(st))Rk(st)(36)
=
∑
q(st |st−1)[Γ (ω¯(st))−µG(ω¯(st))]Rk(st)− 1∑
q(st |st−1)[Γ ′(ω¯(st))−µG′(ω¯(st))]Rk(st)
and the break-even constraint (35).
In each period, a fraction γ of existing entrepreneurs dies and is replaced
by a fraction γ of newborn entrepreneurs. At the beginning of each period,
entrepreneurs learn whether they will die this period. We assume that γ is
sufficiently small and the technology for producing investment goods is suffi-
ciently productive so that entrepreneurs consume their net worth only when
they are about to die. All entrepreneurs who are going to die consume their
entire net worth and do not supply labor in the current period. (The newborn
replacements do instead.) Those entrepreneurs who do not die save their wage
income plus their income from producing capital goods. The aggregate income
of the entrepreneurs is, then,
∫
[ω− ω¯(st)]Rk(st)k(st−1)dF(ω)+we(st)Le
where k(st−1) is the aggregate capital stock. The law of motion for aggregate
net worth is given by
n(st)= γ
∫
[ω− ω¯(st)]Rk(st)k(st−1)dF(ω)+we(st)Le(37)
Total consumption by entrepreneurs in any period is
ce(s
t)= (1 − γ)
∫
[ω− ω¯(st)]Rk(st)k(st−1)dF(ω)(38)
Consumers maximize utility given by
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtπt(s
t)U(c(st) l(st))(39)
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where c(st) denotes consumption in state st subject to
c(st)+
∑
st+1
q(st+1|st)b(st+1)≤w(st)l(st)+ b(st)+ T(st)(40)
for t = 01    and to borrowing constraints, b(st+1) ≥ b¯, for some large neg-
ative number b¯. Here T(st) is lump-sum transfers. The initial condition b(s0)
is given. Each of the bonds b(st+1) is a claim to one unit of consumption in
state st+1 and costs q(st+1|st) dollars in state st . The first-order conditions for
the consumer can be written as
−Ul(s
t)
Uc(st)
=w(st)(41)
and
q(st+1|st)= βπ(st+1|st)Uc(s
t+1)
Uc(st)
(42)
The market-clearing condition for final goods is then
c(st)+ ce(st)+µG(ω¯(st))Rk(st)k(st−1)+ k(st)− (1 − δ)k(st−1)
= y(st)
A1.2. The associated prototype economy with investment wedges
Now consider a prototype economy that is the same as our benchmark pro-
totype economy except for the following changes. We assume that the produc-
tion function is as in (34), with Le interpreted as a fixed input rented from the
government, and we assume that consumers are taxed on capital income but
not on investment or labor income. With capital income taxes, the consumers’
budget constraint is given by
c(st)+ k(st)− (1 − δ)k(st−1)
=w(st)l(st)+ [1 − τk(st)]r(st)k(st−1)+ δτk(st)k(st−1)+ T(st)
where τk(st) is the tax rate on capital income. Here τk(st) plays the role of
an investment wedge. The resource constraint for the prototype economy is
as in the benchmark prototype economy. Let government consumption in the
prototype economy be given by
g(st)= c∗e(st)+µG(ω¯∗(st))R∗k(st)k∗(st−1)(43)
where asterisks denote the allocations in the detailed economy with investment
frictions.
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We now show how the tax on capital income in our prototype economy can
be constructed from the detailed economy. First, the break-even constraint in
the detailed economy can be rewritten as
∑
q∗(st |st−1)
{[
Γ (ω¯∗(st))−µG(ω¯∗(st))]R∗k(st)
+ n
∗(st−1)
k∗(st−1)
U∗c (s
t−1)
βπ(st |st−1)U∗c (st)
}
= 1
where q∗(st |st−1)= βπ(st |st−1)U∗c (st)/U∗c (st−1). The intertemporal Euler equa-
tion in the prototype economy is
∑
q(st |st−1){[1 − τk(st)]A(st)Fk(st)+ (1 − δ)}= 1
where q(st |st−1) = βπ(st |st−1)Uc(st)/Uc(st−1). Let the tax rate on capital in-
come τk(st) be such that
[1 − τk(st)][A(st)F∗k(st)− δ] + 1(44)
= [Γ (ω¯∗(st))−µG(ω¯∗(st))]R∗k(st)+ n
∗(st−1)
k∗(st−1)
U∗c (s
t−1)
βπ(st |st−1)U∗c (st)

Comparing first-order conditions for the two economies, we then have the next
proposition:
PROPOSITION 6: Consider the prototype economy just described, with govern-
ment consumption given by (43) and capital income taxes given by (44). The ag-
gregate equilibrium allocations for this prototype economy coincide with those of
the detailed economy with financial frictions.
A2. Government Consumption Wedges Due to International Borrowing
and Lending
Now we develop a detailed economy with international borrowing and lend-
ing, and show that net exports in that economy are equivalent to a government
consumption wedge in an associated prototype economy.
A2.1. A detailed economy with international borrowing and lending
Consider a model of a world economy with N countries and a single ho-
mogeneous good in each period. We use the same notation for uncertainty as
before.
The representative consumer in country i has preferences
∑
βtπt(s
t)U(ci(s
t) li(s
t))(45)
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where ci(st) and li(st) denote consumption and labor. The consumer’s budget
constraint is
ci(s
t)+ bi(st)+ ki(st)(46)
≤ F(ki(st−1) li(st))+ (1 − δ)ki(st−1)+
∑
st+1
q(st+1/st)bi(st+1)
where bi(st+1) denotes the amount of state-contingent borrowing by the con-
sumer in country i in period t, q(st+1/st) denotes the corresponding state-
contingent price, and ki(st) denotes the capital stock.
An equilibrium for this detailed economy is a set of allocations (ci(st)ki(st)
li(s
t) bi(s
t+1)) and prices q(st/st−1) such that these allocations both solve the
consumer’s problem in each country i and satisfy the world resource constraint:
N∑
i=1
[ci(st)+ ki(st)] ≤
N∑
i=1
[
F(ki(s
t−1) li(st))+ (1 − δ)ki(st−1)
]
(47)
Note that in this economy, the net exports of country i are given by
F(ki(s
t−1) li(st))− [ki(st)− (1 − δ)ki(st−1)] − ci(st)
A2.2. The associated prototype economy with government consumption wedges
Now consider a prototype economy of a single closed economy i with an
exogenous stochastic variable, government consumption gi(st), which we call
the government consumption wedge. In this economy, consumers maximize (45)
subject to their budget constraint
ci(s
t)+ ki(st)=wi(st)li(st)+ [ri(st)+ 1 − δ]ki(st−1)+ Ti(st)(48)
where wi(st), ri(st), and Ti(st) are the wage rate, the capital rental rate, and
lump-sum transfers. In each state st , firms choose k and l to maximize F(k l)−
ri(s
t)k−wi(st)l. The government’s budget constraint is
gi(s
t)+ Ti(st)= 0(49)
The resource constraint for this economy is
ci(s
t)+ gi(st)+ ki(st)= F(ki(st−1) li(st))+ (1 − δ)ki(st−1)(50)
An equilibrium of the prototype economy is, then, a set of allocations (ci(st)
ki(s
t) li(s
t) gi(s
t)Ti(s
t)) and prices (wi(st) ri(st)) such that these allocations
are optimal for consumers and firms, and the resource constraint is satisfied.
The following proposition shows that the government consumption wedge
in this prototype economy consists of net exports in the original economy.
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PROPOSITION 7: Consider the equilibrium allocations (c∗i (s
t)k∗i (s
t) l∗i (s
t)
b∗i (s
t+1)) for country i in the detailed economy. Let the government consumption
wedge be
gi(s
t)= F(k∗i (st−1) l∗i (st))− [k∗i (st)− (1 − δ)k∗i (st−1)] − c∗i (st)(51)
let the wage and capital rental rates be wi(st) = F∗li(st) and ri(st) = F∗ki(st), and
let Ti(st) be defined by (49). Then the allocations (c∗i (s
t)k∗i (s
t) l∗i (s
t) g∗i (s
t)
Ti(s
t)) and the prices (wi(st) ri(st)) are an equilibrium for the prototype econ-
omy.
The proof follows by noting that the first-order conditions are the same in
the two economies and that, given the government consumption wedge (51),
the consumer’s budget constraint (46) in the detailed economy is equivalent to
the resource constraint (50) in the prototype economy.
Note that for simplicity we have abstracted from government consumption in
the detailed economy. If that economy had government consumption as well,
then the government consumption wedge in the prototype economy would be
the sum of net exports and government consumption in the detailed economy.
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